Studying Insurgencies by Bøås, Morten
                                                
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Interdisciplinary Political Studies 
http://siba-ese.unisalento.it/index.php/idps   
ISSN: 2039-8573 (electronic version) 
 
IdPS, Issue 5(1) 2019: 7-22 
DOI: 10.1285/i20398573v5n1p7 
Published: June 24, 2019 
EDITORIAL 
 
Studying Insurgencies 
 
 
Morten Bøås 
Norwegian Institute of International Affairs, NUPI 
 
  
To come to terms with how insurgencies come about, how they seek dif-
ferent types of relationship with local populations and why people chose to join 
them we must acknowledge that many current insurgencies do not fit established 
analytical categories anymore. In his examination of the diversity of armed insur-
gencies in Africa at the end of the twentieth century, Christopher Clapham (1998: 6-
7) distinguished between four broad groups of armed insurgencies. In his typology, 
the groups were divided into 1. liberation insurgencies (such as the anti-colonial na-
tionalist movements (e.g. Mau Mau in Kenya); 2. separatist insurgencies (e.g. the 
Eritrean People’s Liberation Front); 3. reform insurgencies (e.g. Museveni’s Na-
tional Resistance Army in Uganda; 4. warlord insurgencies (e.g. Charles Taylor’s Na-
tional Patriotic Front of Liberia and Foday Sankoh’s Revolutionary United Front in 
Sierra Leone). 
Clapham’s typology was extremely useful, but the majority of recent insur-
gencies do not easily fit into the categories above – the only one that still is much 
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referred to is the ‘warlord’ insurgencies, and even that one has lost most of its ac-
claimed analytical value (see Bøås and Dunn 2017). Thus, while Clapham’s 1998 
collection is still one of the very best attempts to study insurgencies in a compara-
tive manner, the external and internal environments of contemporary insurgencies 
have changed significantly, and the characteristics, dynamics and contexts of insur-
gencies are therefore clearly not the same across time and space.  
However, it has been argued that for insurgent groups the objective of 
armed conflict is not the defeat of the enemy in battle, but the continuation of 
fighting for profit (Keen 2000). While it is important to acknowledge the complex 
ways in which insurgencies have been exploiting opportunities provided to them by 
transformations in the global economy, explanations primarily focusing on the eco-
nomic agendas of armed actors are highly problematic. Such a myopic focus may 
help explain how some conflicts are sustained, but it rarely tells us much about why 
conflicts start in the first place. It would be a mistake, for example, to assume that 
the recent wars in Central and West Africa started as a competition over control of 
alluvial diamonds, coltan and other natural resources or that the current conflict in 
the Sahel is only a by-product of the collusion of the forces of transnational crime 
and regional/international Jihadists that has produced a regional crime-terror nexus 
(see Bøås 2015a).  
In both Sierra Leone and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), the 
integration of the extraction and marketing of natural resources to the conflicts only 
occurred once the conflicts were well under way. Similarly, while there is no doubt 
that illicit goods are transported across the Sahel, there is also a wide spectrum of 
projects of political and social resistance at play in the same area – some peaceful, 
others armed. Some of these projects have a rather secular origin, while others are 
anchored to religious inspirations, some of these are also involved in the transport 
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and protection of illicit goods. Some of those involved in this business are mainly 
profit-seeking actors; others mainly aim to fund resistance projects. However, many 
are also involved in various minor roles in both smuggling operations and resistance 
projects as a coping strategy (Bøås 2015b). Nor does an exclusive focus on illicit 
goods or natural resource extraction explain why these incentives have come to play 
such an important part in recent wars: that is, the economic agenda research as-
sumes the profit motive on the part of the belligerents without exploring why or to 
what extent political-military actors become profit-seeking, market-based actors. To 
understand this transformation, we need to take into account political, cultural and 
historical factors in addition to the economic dimension to conflict. This is precisely 
where the essays in this special issue has much to offer: its emphasis on the need to 
always contextualise conflict and conflict economies indeed helps us approaching 
insurgencies as a broad field of relational agents that dynamically attempt to navi-
gate an evolving field - a field that is at the same time constantly changing and 
deeply entrenched in the politics of people and place that spans decades and centu-
ries. This should be evident even if, obviously, economic agendas are an integral 
part of contemporary insurgent warfare. 
 
1. Understanding insurgency violence 
To understand insurgencies and the insurgents involved in them in the 
Global South, we need a more nuanced understanding of what war and violence are 
all about (see Shelby Ward in this volume that reminds us about the intimate rela-
tionship between violence and nation-building). The conflicts are most often deeply 
embedded in the history of people and place, and not only in colonial history and 
the transformation to independent states, but in the totality of history. Recent and 
distant pasts relate in direct, albeit also sometimes in rather unexpected ways, to on-
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going processes of social change. For example, many of the events and relationships 
that characterise Africa’s recent history – including politics and political violence – 
are intimately entangled in people’s perceptions of their social and ethnic identities. 
These identity perceptions are social constructions; representations that change over 
time and are often distorted and manipulated, particularly as part of discourses of 
domination emanating from those in power in successive colonial and postcolonial 
regimes (see Atkinson 1994).   
Armed struggle has always been in a constant state of flux. As new tech-
nologies, strategies, and pathways to resistance emerge, existing insurgencies at-
tempt to adapt while new ones emerge (see Francesco Buscemi in this volume). 
Global and regional forces – be they political, economic, or social – impact on the 
context of the armed struggles in multiple, and often unpredictable, ways. In some 
cases, local causes of conflicts become interconnected, intertwined, and layered to 
produce a constantly shifting landscape. It is therefore important to acknowledge 
that armed insurgencies are not only forces of disorder, but equally parts of emerg-
ing systems of governance (see Sara Merabti in this volume). In fact, what we see 
today, in the cases where armed insurgencies exist over a prolonged period of time, 
is that a monopolised system of governance has either broken completely down or 
weakened to the extent that competing systems have emerged (Bøås and Dunn 
2017).  
These new systems are characterised by flexibility and adaptability, where 
actors compete for the role of the nodal point in between various networks of at-
tempted informal governance. Such networks collaborate but also compete. At 
times they even are in violent conflict with each other over the issue of control. The 
fluidity of these networks can be reflected in the continuing existence – but chang-
ing function – of regional and local ‘big men’ within these armed insurgencies. In 
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many conflict-prone societies new forms and increasing degree with which these 
‘big men’ (and their networks of governance) are connected to other regional and 
international networks and markets, further lead to the emergence of networks that 
are increasingly characterised by their adaptability and pragmatic shifting of alli-
ances. 
Regardless of the internal dynamics, new networks of power and rule are 
constructed that challenge – and replace – existing systems of governance. What we 
see are complex political configurations that have shifted away from monopolised 
systems of governance and patronage to one characterised by a multitude of shifting 
alliances due to the completion between actors and networks of patronage. The 
consequence of this for a research agenda that aim to understand violent conflict 
and the involvement of armed non-state actors therein, is that it is confronted with 
a field of constant flux and fragmentation. In such an intellectual endeavour, the 
important dimension to keep track is less the very agents of violence: but rather, the 
nodal points in these networks of governance and violence, and their ability to 
maintain networks across space and time should increasingly come under the spot-
light (Bøås and Dunn 2017).  
Thus, if we take recent conflict trends as a guide to the future, the field is 
and will continue to be characterised by complicated conflicts in politically difficult 
terrains. Conflicts where there is no clear endgame in sight, and where United Na-
tions (UN)’ missions or other international peace-building interventions will be left 
to grapple with weak states, increasingly unpopular national leaders with low levels 
of legitimacy. Such missions and interventions may therefore easily end up fighting 
or attempting to control insurgents that are not only hard to beat militarily, but also 
that have agendas which leaves little if any room for a negotiated settlement to the 
conflict. Such conflicts will also most likely take place in areas of the world where 
11 
 
Interdisciplinary Political Studies, 5(1) 2019: 7-22, DOI: 10.1285/i20398573v5n1p7 
  
local livelihoods are under pressure from a number of external shocks, including in-
creased climatic variability, and the states in question are rarely seen as an actor able 
to offer local populations much support. Often it will be the opposite: the state(s) 
are seen as part of the problem and not the solution (see Alessio Iocchi in this vol-
ume).   
This ʻmessinessʼ of things to come is easily observable in a number of ar-
eas in which the UN and the international community at large are engaged in by 
means of various peace operations such as in Afghanistan, the border areas between 
Iraq and Syria and the Sahel. Here international stabilisation efforts often come 
short as they fail to comprehend local contexts as well as perceptions of conflict 
and conflict resolution (see Laura Berlingozzi in this volume). Even if all of these 
conflict areas come with their own set of unique challenges, there are also certain 
commonalities that need to be thought through carefully. Thus, even if underlying 
cleavages and conflict lines may be relatively permanent, we are also currently faced 
with a new type of insurgencies that does not fit very well with the established con-
ceptual categories. These new ‘insurgents’ that we can observe in parts of Africa and 
the Middle East are not uniquely fighting for national liberation, involved in a sepa-
ratist struggle, have a revolutionary character in the traditional sense, nor are they 
just a warlord profit-maximising operation. However, even if they are none of these, 
they also contain traces of each and every one of them. 
 
2. A new wave of insurgencies? 
The conflict zone of the Mali-Sahel periphery offers an apt illustration of 
the arguments made above. It is crisscrossed by a number of old cleavages. Some 
date back to precolonial times as is the case of the relationship between the Tuareg 
of Mali and the black majority population. This cleavage, however, has frozen as 
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successive series of regimes in Bamako have been unable to unpack the contrac-
tions colonialism created when a previous elite trade-and-warrior group, e.g. the Tu-
areg was turned into a permanent political minority. after Mali gained independence 
from France. Others have a more contemporary origin, but still create considerable 
regional ramifications as is the case of groups that lost the Algerian civil war in the 
1990s, but has transformed themselves into regional insurgencies, i.e., al-Qaeda in 
the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM).  
The Sahel also undoubtedly consists of states lacking in state capacity as 
well as legitimacy. It is an area of the world where local livelihoods are under im-
mense pressure due to a combination of increased climatic variability and the inabil-
ity of both the states in the region and the international community to react force-
fully and adequately to this. This part of the world is a much used passage for 
weapons and drugs as well as people trying to get out of Africa (see for example 
Shaw and Tinti 2014), and a number of insurgencies are active in the region, both 
Jihadist and secular organisations.  
However, this does not mean that the Sahel has become the prototype of a 
‘new war’ – a war that takes place in an ‘ungoverned space’ constituted by a nexus 
of transnational crime and global terrorism. This part of the world is not without 
certain levels of order and governance, yet these levels are also clearly of another 
type than the one that students read about in standard political science textbooks. 
Instead, what we need to draw attention to is the dense conglomeration of overlap-
ping and competing ‘big men’ networks of informal/illicit trade, governance and re-
sistance that exists in this area. These operates as networks based on personal 
power as the ‘attainment of big man status is the outcome of a series of acts which 
elevate a person above the common herd and attract him a coterie of loyal, lesser 
men’ (Sahlins 1963: 289). These networks vary in depth, geographical reach and 
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ability to penetrate the state, but all of them are unstable, changing and constantly 
adaptable, and while they rest on some sort of common interests, participants do 
not necessarily share the same goals or have similar reasons for being involved.  
The elevation to ‘big man’ status does not follow one universal path. It 
varies in time and space and it can be based on different combinations of power. 
However, in an area such as this where authority is always contested, it must include 
the ability to use force, to generate resources and not the least to locate authority in 
and between the state and the informal. The example of the Sahel ‘big man’ Ibrahim 
Ag Bahanga illustrates this. Ag Bahanga embarked on his ‘big man’ career during 
the Tuareg rebellion in the 1990s as a lesser rebel leader, and gained control of a 
commune (division of local government) after the rebellion ended. He was involved 
in trade and smuggling; he led other rebellions, and at the same time, until his death 
in August 2011 maintained relationships with neighbouring governments, e.g. Alge-
ria and Libya, as well as with certain segments of the Malian government and ad-
ministration. Thus, his status as a ‘big man’ was not only based on one of these ac-
tivities, but the totality of them and thereby his ability to, if not control, at least in-
fluence and maintain different and also partly overlapping networks that in their 
own right do not have much commonality with regard to long-term objectives and 
strategy (Bøås 2015b).  
Some of these networks and the ‘big men’ involved are therefore mainly 
about criminality (and coping), whereas others make use of such activities to finance 
various projects of resistance (secular and religious). This may bring different net-
works and their ‘big men’ into conflict with each other, but conflict at certain times 
does not prevent collaboration and collusion during other times and circumstances, 
thus suggesting that a nexus of transnational crime and global terrorism does not 
exist in a form that makes it possible to depict it as a fixed entity with permanent 
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organisational features. Rather, the logic of these operations and networks involved 
is ambiguity and flexibility, and the actors involved are ‘flexians’ who adapt them-
selves and their resources to ever-changing circumstances in the terrain in which 
they operate (see also Wedel 2009 or Guichaoua 2011). 
This does not mean that plasticity is total. Certain relationships and net-
works are not only more possible than others, but also more permanent. Ethnicity 
and kinship may matter, but so do the dangers of certain relationships, no matter 
how profitable they may be. One example is the networks of the Jihadist Mokhtar 
Belmokhtar. It is reasonable to claim that most of this more secular-oriented crimi-
nal networks vanished the moment he took responsibility for the In Aménas attack 
in Algeria in January 2013. This did not make doing business with him less profit-
able per se, but it certainly made it too dangerous.  
What the examples above suggest is that the logic of the relationship be-
tween criminality, coping and resistance in the Sahel periphery to a certain degree 
can be described as ‘ships passing in the night’, but certain ‘ships’ pass each other 
more frequently than others. Nonetheless, what this leaves us with is a scenario 
where different competing ‘big men’ vie for the role of nodal points in different 
networks of informal governance: some mainly profit-driven, others combining in-
come-generating strategies with social and political objectives (social and religious), 
yet other simply aiming to come (and hopefully thrive in the future). As the very 
constellation of these networks is changing, these acts and behaviours are therefore 
organised, but without much of formal or permanent organisation attached to it. 
This makes it possible to combine various strategies of criminality, cooping and re-
sistance without necessarily losing sight of either immediate or long-term objectives. 
The outcome is a narrative-driven space of co-existence, collusion and conflict in 
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which the conflation of different actors’ interests, ideas and actions only will lead to 
analytical confusion as well as misguided policy prescriptions (Bøås 2015b).  
This is therefore the social landscape in which a new wave of insurgencies 
seems to thrive. One example of such an insurgency is AQIM. This insurgency is 
often viewed as one of the major lynchpins in the ‘crime-terror nexus’ that has 
taken advantage of the ‘ungoverned space’ of the Mali-Sahel periphery. Seen as an 
operational branch of the global al-Qaeda structure, it is viewed as an organisation 
that preys on the instability of the region to finance its criminal terrorist activities. 
However, if we look beyond AQIM’s global rhetoric, a slightly different picture 
emerges. AQIM has clear strategies of integration in the Sahel that are based on a 
sophisticated reading of the local context that enables the organisation to appropri-
ate local grievances and cleavages. The group’s members also know how to com-
bine the strength of its money, guns and prayers. The latter is of particular impor-
tance in an area where local state administration, to the extent that it exists, is gen-
erally perceived by the local population as corrupt, whereas AQIM operatives pre-
sent themselves as honest and pious Muslims (see also Bleck and Michelitch 2015). 
AQIM’s point of origin is the Algerian civil war. Its predecessor, the 
Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC), was formed by Hassan Hattab 
as a breakaway faction of the Armed Islamic Group (GIA), mainly as a reaction to 
the immense and senseless violence of the GIA in the latter years of the Algerian 
civil war. Officially, GSCP moved into northern Mali in 2003-2004, but they already 
had rear bases in the area since 1998 (Bøås and Torheim 2013). The relationship be-
tween GSCP and al-Qaeda is not straightforward, as this is a history of statements 
of mutual collaboration, but also of open conflict. When GSCP was established in 
1998, the organisation expresses support for al-Qaeda, only to claim that it had bro-
ken away from al-.Qaeda in 2001(see ICG 2005). GSCP reaffirmed its loyalty in 
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2003, was blessed by al-Qaeda in 2006, and then finally embraced the al-Qaeda 
banner in 2007 when GSCP changed its name to AQIM (see Rollins 2010). 
The GSCP may have done this for ideological reasons, but more pragmatic 
brand concerns also played a role. They had little to lose and possibly a lot to gain 
from taking up the al-Qaeda banner: it would make them look more global and 
powerful in the eyes of local communities than they actually were at the time.  
However, when AQIM started to materialise in Northern Mali, it had 
more than a potent brand name. The AQIM fighters also had money; their main 
source of wealth originated from hostage taking, particularly the kidnapping of 32 
German tourists in 2003. These tourists were captured when travelling through the 
Sahara and were held hostage for several months before they were released. AQIM 
used its new-found wealth wisely, trading with local communities, but also re-
distributing money, medicine, as well as SIM cards and airtime. What this reveals is 
that AQIM’s ability to embed itself locally is not based only on its ability to use 
force, but also on the establishment of an order based on financial strength applied 
through a religious-ideological framework. Already in 1998, AQIM members (then 
known as GSCP) started to arrive in the Timbuktu region (ICG 2005), and they ap-
proached the local population as honest and pious traders, paying a good price for 
the goods they brought locally. In this way, they bought themselves goodwill, 
friendship and networks. They also married locally – not into powerful families, but 
poor local lineages, deliberately taking the side of the impoverished (Bøås and Tor-
heim 2013). Thus, in many ways, AQIM was acting as an Islamic charity, with the 
exception that they carried arms and did not hesitate to use them if needed. Thus, in 
addition to the ability to use force and generate resources, an insurgency repertoire 
can also usefully include a well-branded image of religious credentials and simply 
being honest and pious.  
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What this leaves us with is a new wave of insurgencies that are both deeply 
local and anchored in global discourses at the same time. Branding has become an 
integral part of their strategy. They are religious fundamentalists, but also pragmatic 
and extremely good at appropriating local grievances for their own purposes. As the 
case of AQIM indicates, most of them also operate in environments of little state 
control and state legitimacy where local livelihoods are under immense pressure due 
to a combination of increased climatic variability and the inability of the states to 
adequately react to this. As they are not seeking to capture the state or to break 
away from a state, but challenge the very notion of the modern state, there is no or 
only a very narrow margin for a negotiated settlement. Finally, as a majority of these 
insurgencies also seems to be very hard to beat militarily, the UN and the interna-
tional community at large may be left to deal with conflict situations whose solution 
is very hard to find. 
 
3. Some lines to conclude 
The technologies of war, the modes of warfare and the language used to 
frame war is constantly evolving: however, this is not in itself a conclusive proof 
that a substantially new phenomenon under the heading of ‘new wars’ has emerged. 
Insurgents have always adapted to changing circumstances, including new opportu-
nities for funding their projects of violent resistance, and the very nature of the con-
flict seems to be, if not completely permanent, at least much more lasting over time. 
This is also why it is so important to point out that all the conflicts and conflict 
zones currently active have deep historical roots: more often than not, the underly-
ing cleavages that fuels the conflict are dating far back in history beyond the colo-
nial period.  
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Each and every one of them are an offspring of unique social trajectories. 
Africa insurgencies, though, have something in common: that is, they have always 
been both the creation of and a response to political realities and their institutional 
manifestations. The ‘new wars’ literature, with is focus on economic agendas, trans-
national crime and terrorism can be very useful in explaining how armed move-
ments sustains themselves, but this does not tell us very much about why these con-
flicts started in the first place nor about the wider motivations of those involved 
and the violence used. To understand this, we also need to take into account politi-
cal, cultural and historical factors. The past and the present are connected in wars 
where insurgents are involved as elsewhere, and the only way we can hope to un-
derstand this is to consider how current conflicts are an integral part of the total his-
tory of the area in question. Due to the continued privileged position of the state – 
in theory as well as practice – examining who controls it and for what purpose is 
one obvious place to start our investigations. However, we need to keep in mind 
that almost all conflicts are local in character, and that not only material aspects 
matter, but also questions concerning identity and belonging. This means that what 
we need is a flexible and broad-based definition of what constitutes the ‘political’: 
politics in Mali for example is both formal and informal, yet the most significant po-
litical spaces are the ones that exist in-between the formal and the informal. 
Insurgent wars are often brutal, and the consequences in terms of human 
suffering can be immense. However, such conflicts and the actors involved do not 
constitute anything substantially new, nor are they incomprehensible. It is only our 
approaches that all too often make us avoid seeing the obvious: people take up arms 
because they are angry, scared, poor, or short of other livelihood opportunities.  
Thus, even if the new wave of insurgencies does not fit well with the es-
tablished categories of insurgencies (see Clapham 1998), this does not mean that 
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they cannot be studied in a comparative manner. Far from behaving like classical 
insurgencies such as the Ethiopian and Eritrean ones of the 1980s and 1990s, the 
current ones seem more to be manifestations of rage against the patrimonial ma-
chinery of dysfunctional state structures: largely youth rebellions organised in social 
movements with a cultic element (see also Bøås and Dunn 2007). However, 
through empirical grounded studies of insurgent practices we can still establish con-
ceptual categories as those suggested in this introduction that may enable a frame-
work for analysis of single-case studies as well as mid-range theorising based on fo-
cused and structured comparisons. 
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